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Korean and Japanese Church Relations After 1945:
The Path to Reconciliation (1)
Mansong Ko, Brian Byrd
1. Introduction
On August 15, 1945, the day of Japan’s surrender that ended World 
War II, Japan and Korea faced historic turning points. For the Japanese, it 
was haisenbi (Day of Defeat); for the Koreans it was gwangbogjeol (Liber-
ation Day). From opposing departure points, on that day both countries 
embarked on a journey toward becoming fully democratic nations.
Today, Korea and Japan are the only democratic countries in 
Northeast Asia. But although both nations instituted many reforms 
following the war, they did not establish diplomatic relations with each 
other until twenty years had passed. The treaty Japan and Korea then 
signed in 1965 normalizing diplomatic relations lacked any hint of reflection 
or repentance on the part of the Japanese regarding their treatment of 
the Korean people during Japan’s thirty-six year occupation of Korea. 
The Korean government’s overly conciliatory negotiations insulted and 
enraged many Koreans, who believed they had suffered too much under 
Japanese rule to be bought off by the economic assistance the treaty would 
provide. Theologically liberal and moderate Korean Christians “organized 
a campaign to block negotiations leading toward diplomatic relations with 
Japan.”(2) Their protest led to soul-searching and repentance on the part 
of the church in Japan, which up to that point had not taken into account 
the suffering of the Koreans, and much less the complicity of the Japanese 
church in causing this suf fering. With Japanese repentance, Korean 
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churches came to accept Japanese churches as brothers and sisters in 
Christ and as partners in missions. 
This paper will discuss why it took twenty years for the Japanese and 
Korean churches to begin to relate to each other, and the path that led to 
their reconciliation. It will then consider some of the fruits and challenges 
experienced by Japanese and Korean churches in a process of reconcili-
ation that continues today.
Any attempt to discuss the reconciliation between the churches in 
Korea and Japan needs to take into account the nature of the church 
groups and denominations in each nation. This paper focuses mainly on 
relations between the United Church of Christ in Japan (Kyodan) and three 
major denominations in Korea: the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of 
Korea (PROK); the much larger Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK); and 
the Korean Methodist Church.
The Kyodan, whose membership edged up to 200,000 by the 1970s, 
slowly began losing members from the mid-1990s, and stands now at 
180,000, less than a third of the 670,000 Protestants in Japan. The Kyodan 
was divided for many years between one faction that emphasized social 
action and another that tended to shy away from political issues and 
focused more exclusively on ecclesiastical matters. The more liberal and 
social action-oriented Japanese churches and their leaders took much of 
the first initiative in reaching out to their politically active Korean counter-
parts, who were mainly, but not exclusively, in the PROK. The PROK, with 
300,000 members now, has always been a small minority among Korean 
Protestants. Leaders in the PROK have a reputation for being theologically 
liberal and politically active. The lay members, however, are generally more 
conservative, and often frown upon their pastors’ activism. As a result, 
along with some of the pastors, members of organizations like the Korean 
Student Christian Federation and the YMCA have taken the lead in the 
political action efforts of the PROK.(3)
The PCK, the parent church from which the PROK broke off in 1954, 
now has about 2,800,000 members. Although it chafed some under the 
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Korean military dictatorships during the 1970s and 1980s, the PCK chose 
for the most part to steer clear of politics. Instead, under the leadership of 
Han Kyung-chik, the PCK worked for spiritual revival and the conversion of 
individuals. By taking the path of non-confrontation with the government, 
the PCK gained the freedom to work within the military, the police force, 
hospitals, and other government-related institutions. Phenomenal church 
growth resulted. Military chaplains in the 1970s, for example, sometimes 
baptized thousands of the conscripted soldiers in a single day.(4) The PCK 
also gained members as it rallied for mass crusades led by evangelists like 
Billy Graham in 1973 and Bill Bright in 1974. From the latter half of the 
1980s, the PCK has become more involved in social-political issues. The 
Korean Methodist Church, with about 1,500,000 members, also empha-
sized evangelism over social activism during the 1970s and 1980s, but 
began taking stronger stands on social issues from the late 1980s.
The Korean denominations discussed here account for just over half 
of the Protestants in Korea. The remaining denominations have typically 
been more conservative politically and theologically. Chung-shin Park, 
in Protestantism and Politics in Korea (2003) discusses the bitter rivalries 
and opposing political viewpoints, and the increasing fragmentation, along 
with impressive growth statistics, that have historically characterized 
the Protestant denominations in Korea. Having briefly introduced the 
Protestant groups in Japan and Korea that we will focus on in this paper, we 
examine now the path that led to their reconciliation after 1945.
2. A Country So Close Yet So Far
“So close yet so far” is an expression used often in both Korea and 
Japan to refer to the fact that the two countries, although geographically 
close, have lacked normal relations. This expression applies well to 
relations between the Japanese and Korean churches in the years following 
World War II.
Korean Christians greeted the end of Japanese rule with an explosive 
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release of pent-up rage. Before nightfall on the day of their liberation, 
Christians in Pyongyang, known for its Christian fervor as “the Jerusalem 
of the East,” had torched the city’s Shinto Shrine. Throughout Korea 1,141 
shrines, hated symbols of Japanese oppression and religious persecution, 
soon met a similar fate.(5)
The Japanese rulers and their police enforcers went home. But 
bitterness toward the Japanese people smoldered on in the Koreans’ 
hearts. Koreans had lived for thirty-six years (1910—1945) under a Japanese 
police state and had suffered greatly. Treated as slaves, they had been 
disposable parts of the Japanese war machine. They had been driven off 
their land and forced to fend for themselves in the harsh Manchurian 
hinterlands. They had been commanded to produce rice for Japanese tables 
while they struggled to survive. They had worked as laborers, soldiers, and 
sexual slaves (in Japanese and Korean, the euphemistic “comfort women”). 
They had been forbidden to speak Korean and had had to give up their 
Korean names for Japanese names.
From early in their occupation, Japan had worked to undermine and 
weaken any resistance to its rule, particularly by corrupting the morals 
of young Korean men. It brought in Japanese prostitutes and established 
a system of regulated brothels; sold opium freely to the Koreans while 
threatening Japanese who partook with loss of citizenship; and introduced 
card games for gambling, all to preoccupy and addict the youth.(6)
The Japanese had particularly feared the church in Korea. The church 
had provided the leadership for the March First Korean Independence 
Movement of 1919; even after the Japanese soldiers savagely crushed this 
uprising, the church continued to grow. It stood as a symbol of nationalism, 
and functioned as a place where Koreans could freely gather to discuss 
matters, including their grievances with the colonial authorities.
Although a few prewar Japanese Christians had served the Koreans 
and earned their respect, other Japanese Christian leaders had worked 
with the Japanese government to subdue Korean Christians and to subvert 
their faith. Tomita Mitsuru, head of the Nihon Kirisuto Kyokai (the leading 
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prewar Japanese denomination) and of the Kyodan when it was formed in 
1941, travelled to Pyongyang in 1938 with a mission: to persuade Korean 
Christians that bowing at shrines was a civil, not a religious act. In an 
all-night meeting between Tomita and a group of Korean pastors, leading 
Korean pastor Ju Gi-cheul stood firmly on scripture and against Tomita. 
The ever-vigilant Japanese special police soon after arrested Ju for daring 
to speak against shrine worship. Through the years of deprivation and 
excruciating torture that followed, Ju refused to compromise his position. 
He died in prison in 1944.(7) Under such pressure from the Japanese special 
police, the great majority of Korean Christians were bullied into bowing. 
Fifty church leaders, however, like Ju, chose to accept the ultimate penalty 
rather than to bow. Another 2000 “living martyrs,” those who had refused 
to bow and were incarcerated, were freed from prison torture chambers on 
Liberation Day.(8)
Korean-Japanese relations would not easily be restored. Knowing this, 
Korean Christian leader Kim Jae-joon suggested a five-year moratorium on 
relations with the Japanese—underestimating by a power of four the years 
that would actually be needed before the two churches could sit together 
again.(9) Having been so badly burned, most Koreans did not want to see a 
Japanese face.
Japanese Christians, caught up in the pain of their own defeat and 
devastation, knew little of the Korean Christians’ wartime plight and 
postwar bitterness. Like the Koreans, Japanese Christians had been 
coopted by the militarists into obeisance to the Imperial cult. Some 
had willingly played the role of patriots; others had cooperated under 
compulsion.
They responded to the war’s end in various ways. World-renowned 
social activist and evangelist Kagawa Toyohiko saw defeat as a chance 
for a new, peaceful beginning. He reflected on the causes for Japan’s 
defeat, listing as one Japan’s lack of religious education and sensitivity, 
shown in Japan’s forcing Korean pastors to make Japanese god shelves 
(kamidana).(10)
18
On the whole, however, Moderator Tomita Mitsuru and the Kyodan 
leadership concerned itself less with the countries of Asia than with their 
American conquerors and occupiers.(11) For Japanese Christians, Korea and 
Korean Christians were at best peripheral concerns. On the other hand, 
American Christian leaders were actively seeking to make connections 
with Japanese Christians. Four delegates from the American church visited 
Japan in the fall of 1945 and apologized profusely to the Japanese Christians 
for the devastation wrecked by American bombings. As they embraced 
the American churchmen in the rubble that had been Tokyo, the Japanese 
Christians exclaimed again and again, “This is the happiest day of my life.” 
The war was over. One of the American delegates exuded in describing 
this happy reunion: “A triumph of Christian love…rose above nationality 
and washed out the past in tears of forgiveness.” This was “possible only 
between brothers whose return signalizes the restoration of a family tie 
which was never broken.”(12) Two months after the war, America and Japan 
had reconciled. With the encouragement of General Douglas MacArthur, 
American missionaries soon arrived in Japan both to evangelize and to 
provide practical relief for the beleaguered Japanese. 
The Japanese Christians, however, were apparently in no frame of 
mind to extend the joy they experienced over renewed ties with American 
Christians to the Korean Christians. Nor could they follow the American 
example and come forth with apologies for wrongs suffered by Koreans 
at the hands of the Japanese—and the Japanese church. Two decades 
passed; nothing happened. Japanese and Korean Christians remained out 
of fellowship and out of touch. This disconnect showed itself in 1959 in the 
matter of the repatriation of Koreans from Japan to North Korea.
When the war ended, 2.4 million Koreans were living on Japanese 
soil. 670,000 had been forcefully moved to Japan between 1938 and 1945. 
Although most Koreans returned to their ancestral homelands by 1946, 
about 650,000 remained in Japan.(13) The Japanese government saw these 
Koreans as an added burden. They claimed the Koreans used scarce 
resources, committed more than their share of crimes, and sided with the 
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communists. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru wanted them out, and the 
sooner the better. The great majority had come from South Korea, but to 
the Japanese authorities, whether they were sent back to North or South 
Korea did not matter.
Following the Korean War, North Korea invited the Koreans in Japan 
to come to its socialist “paradise,” promising them free education and 
medical care.(14) Many took the bait. From December 1959 to 1984, a total 
of 93,340 Japanese Koreans returned to North Korea through the Japanese 
Red Cross.(15) Waiting them was not a workers’ paradise, but hard labor and 
great deprivation.(16)
South Koreans, well aware of what was happening in North Korea, 
protested the repatriation of their fellows to the North. South Korean 
Christians spoke out as well. They knew the North Korean government 
persecuted Christians, destroyed their churches, and squelched religious 
freedom. A headline for an editorial in the PCK’s newspaper Kidok Gongbo 
loudly declared, “The Church also Opposes the Deportation of Koreans 
to the North” and called for the Japanese church to take up the cause of 
the repatriates being led into captivity: “Japanese churches should not 
sit and watch. We expect them to act with good conscience for humanity 
and justice, as they are faced with the government’s decision to send free 
citizens to the Communist bloc.”(17)
Japanese Christians, however, had no way to hear these protests and 
pleas. Adding to the blanket of silence, many in the Kyodan, leaning to 
the political left, lacked the realism to see through the propaganda to the 
dire realities of North Korea. The Kyodan Times blithely remarked, “We 
Japanese Christians hope that this [repatriation] is carried out without 
trouble and as smoothly as possible.”(18) Lacking vital connection with the 
church in Korea, Japanese Christians accepted without question their 
nation’s repatriation policy.
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3. The Path to Reconciliation
In the 1960s, Korean and Japanese Christians began to mend ties. 
Leaders in the Japanese church visited and established contact with 
their Korean counterparts. They began to take interest in the Koreans’ 
struggles. They came to realize more clearly the bitterness Koreans 
felt towards their former colonizers. Finally, in 1967, the Moderator of 
the Kyodan confessed the complicity of the wartime Japanese church 
in oppressing Korean Christians. This section traces these steps toward 
reconciliation.
In 1960, the Korean student-led April Revolution sent the corrupt 
President Syngman Rhee packing for exile in Hawaii.(19) The Kyodan Times 
looked positively at this event, seeing it as a turning point for freedom 
in Korea. However, the same editorial showed its utter ignorance of 
the Korean mindset in interpreting Rhee’s departure as giving Koreans 
“liberation even greater” than they had experienced in their release from 
Japanese rule. Korean Christians likened August 15, 1945 to the Jewish 
exodus from bondage in Egypt and as the “day of greatest joy in the 
twentieth century.” The editorial concluded with a prayer for the breaking 
down of the wall between Japan and Korea and for Japanese and Korean 
churches to link hands for the evangelism of Asia.(20) Until the Japanese 
church could see and confess its role in erecting this wall, the well-intended 
prayer would remain unanswered.
It would take a new generation of Japanese Christian leaders, typified 
by Suzuki Masahisa and Omura Isamu, to bring about this transformation. 
Suzuki learned firsthand of Japanese prejudice towards Koreans when he 
spoke at retreats for Korean Christian youth living in Japan. He learned 
firsthand from these fellow Christians, for example, that few Japanese 
landlords would consider renting to Koreans. Feeling the Koreans’ pain 
saddened Suzuki and made him angry at this Japanese mentality.(21)
When Major General Park Chung-hee seized power in Korea in a 
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May 1961 military coup, Suzuki prayed that Korean Christians could stand 
through this crisis as “watchmen” for their nation.(22) He believed that the 
Koreans were “neighbors.” He stated, “the coup took place in a neighbor 
country with which we have the deepest relationship.” Suzuki did not just 
call Korea a neighbor, but dedicated his life to breaking down the wall 
separating the two nations’ churches. And as Suzuki knew, change required 
open, honest communication.
Although attempts at Japanese and Korean interchurch exchanges had 
been made in the 1950s, not until 1962 did a delegation from the Kyodan 
actually meet with Korean church leaders.(23) A Kidok Gongbo editorial 
commenting on the exchange noted the potential for good relations to 
develop: “Historically and geographically, the people of Korea and Japan 
should have the closest of relationships.” But it also recalled that “the 
invasions in the past, stemming from the delusions of world domination 
of Japanese imperialists and militarists, have wrought the greatest of 
sufferings on the Korean people.”(24) These injustices and injuries loomed 
large in the Korean consciousness in any contemplation of reconciliation 
with Japan. The Japanese church representatives’ sincere apologies and 
dialogue with the Korean church, however, demonstrated the potential 
for people of faith to achieve what the Japanese and Korean governments 
had failed to do. “As the politicians of Korea and Japan cannot achieve the 
peace and harmony that we so long for, is it not time for the two countries’ 
Christians to show more faith and love, and contribute to diplomatic 
normalization?”(25)
As a matter of fact, Japanese and Korean politicians were already at 
work after Park seized power, discussing terms for diplomatic normal-
ization in a series of meetings called the Japan-Korea Conferences. The 
American government was pushing its Japanese and Korean allies to 
form a united front in Northeast Asia because America was deepening 
its involvement in Southeast Asia with the Vietnam War. On the Korean 
side, President Park wanted foreign capital from Japan to jump-start his 
country’s stalled economy. The meetings moved forward apace, and in June 
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1965, Japan and the Republic of Korea signed the Treaty on Basic Relations 
restoring diplomatic relations the two nations. The treaty committed Japan 
to providing Korea with $800 million in grants and soft loans—so long 
as these were not called reparations.(26) The treaty made no mention of a 
Japanese apology for the past.(27)
These proceedings, however, rankled liberal and moderate Korean 
Christian leaders. The Korean National Council of Churches (KNCC) 
began a movement in 1964 against the treaty’s ratification, criticizing 
Korea’s overly conciliatory tone and recoiling at Japan’s arrogance.(28)
As soon as the treaty was signed, Han Kyung-chik called a “Prayer 
Meeting to Save the Country.” In a “Manifesto by the Christian Committee 
to Save the Country,” Han and 240 fellow pastors called for Japan’s repen-
tance as a prerequisite for the reconciliation between the two countries. 
They declared, “For truthful reconciliation, we need to repent of the sins of 
the past, and promise our mutual service and cooperation based on good 
will.(29)
The Korean Christian leaders saw in the treaty specters of a past too 
painful to forget. “Japan’s attitude towards Korea is nothing less than that of 
the strong against the weak, a blatant neo-colonialist stance to expropriate 
benefits only for itself.” The treaty “would only intensify conflicts and 
animosity, not friendship, between the Koreans and the Japanese.”(30) Many 
believed that the treaty reflected Japan’s plans for an economic invasion of 
their country.
The journal Christian Thought, in ar ticles on the Japan-Korea 
Conferences, pointed out a “fundamental psychological problem...in the 
undercurrent of the numerous difficult problems regarding the diplomatic 
normalization of Korea and Japan...lack of trust.”(31) This long-standing 
Korean sentiment towards Japan stemmed from pain inflicted, promises 
broken, and expectations betrayed— the experience of Koreans during the 
thirty-six years of Japanese occupation. Nationalist sentiment against Japan 
intensified, as diplomatic normalization was force-fed to the nation before 
the psychological scars had healed.
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Meanwhile, a Korean pastor implicated Japanese Christians for 
“not truly repenting before God’s judgment...They...avoid remembering 
what their country has done to the Asian race or thinking of how to wash 
away their sins. Japanese Christians only show cheap sympathy [towards 
Koreans].”(32)
These Korean Christian protests caused the Japanese church to look 
more deeply into the problems that divided the two nations. Japanese 
Christians began to realize that the fundamental barrier between Korea and 
Japan was psychological, stemming from a deep bitterness (han) held by 
the Koreans towards the Japanese.
How could the church overcome these psychological barriers of 
Japanese prejudice and Korean bitterness? The 50 th Assembly of the 
Presbyterian Church of Korea in September 1965 would provide a forum. 
The Moderator of the Kyodan, Omura Isamu, attended the conference. He 
knew there was “fierce opposition in Korea, especially among Christians to 
the ratification of the Korea-Japan Treaty...opposition stemming from the 
indelible psychological scar caused by Japan’s past brutalities.”(33)
PROK theologian and leader Kim Jae-joon had invited Omura to 
attend the Assembly. But while Omura waited in the meeting for his turn 
to speak, the mere presence of this Japanese Christian caused intense, 
prolonged debate to break out among the Korean representatives. They 
finally voted, but only narrowly, to allow Omura to address them. As he 
stood at the podium in the tension-packed room, Omura spoke of his own 
“agony” at the horrible mistakes, the political oppression, and the abuse of 
human rights that had marked Japan’s rule over Korea. As a representative 
of the Kyodan, he expressed deep regret over and repented of these 
wrongdoings. Furthermore, Omura apologized for negligence in “so far not 
making any effort towards solidarity” and pledged that the Kyodan would 
reach out to the Korean church so that together they could “carry out the 
Great Commission entrusted to us by Jesus Christ our Lord.”(34)
While Omura made no specific reference to the sins of the Japanese 
church, his visit and apology opened the door for deepened relationships 
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with the Korean Christians. They understood his message as “genuine 
repentance for sins committed over the thirty-six years [of Japanese 
colonialism]” and a step on the “path to reconciliation.”(35) Returning to 
Japan, Omura reflected on his experience with Christians in Korea. “The 
great problem in Korean-Japanese relationships is this: Japanese people do 
not know Korean people very well. They do not know how Koreans feel, 
and that is the problem.”(36) Omura called this a “problem of the heart.”(37)
Some within the Kyodan questioned the purpose of Omura’s visit to 
Korea, wondering, “what exactly he apologized for?”(38) Omura responded, 
“To work for reconciliation between Japan and Korea that will bring us 
beyond the current unfortunate relationship is the obvious responsibility 
for one who follows God. Quoting Matthew 5:23—24, he continued, “The 
Japanese church apologizes and repents for the political and humanitarian 
sins committed in the past by Japan. It also recognizes itself as repre-
senting the Japanese people in this apology. I believe that this is a debt that 
the Japanese church must repay, a duty it must fulfill.”(39) Omura preached 
on how, through fellowship with Korean Christians, he had come to see 
himself as a “perpetrator,” rather than “victim” of the war. “Japanese Chris-
tians used to have something akin to a victim mentality with respect to the 
Japanese government and its militarists, but they were wrong. Their own 
country did wrong. As it invaded other countries during the war, were we 
not also the perpetrators? The church, as much as the country, is a perpe-
trator.(40) He continued, “The crimes that our country committed were the 
churches’ crimes as well. I confess with full honesty. This is what everyone 
in Japanese churches should take as his own responsibility.”(41)
Suzuki Masahisa accepted this responsibility when he succeeded 
Omura as Moderator of the Kyodan. On March 26, 1967, in the “Kyodan 
Confession of Wartime Responsibility,” Suzuki formally repented on behalf 
of the Japanese churches that had cooperated with Japanese militarists 
during World War II and asked the forgiveness of the churches in Asia. The 
Confession read, “Indeed, even as our country committed sin, so we too 
as a church committed the same sin… Now, with deep pain in our hearts, 
25Korean and Japanese Church Relations After 1945
we confess our sin and ask the Lord for forgiveness. We also seek the 
forgiveness of the peoples of all nations, particularly in Asia.”(42)
Suzuki’s public confession satisfied the Korean Christians and opened 
the way for the representatives of the Kyodan and three major Protestant 
denominations in Korea to meet in July of 1967 to write a proposal for a 
mutual Mission Agreement.(43) The churches ratified this agreement the 
following year, as they committed themselves to “look back on the painful 
history of both their countries, and stand on the gospel of reconciliation, 
seeking new and deepened fellowship as friends in the Lord.” This would 
imply 1) active involvement in missions, 2) the creation of of fices to 
facilitate communication, 3) the exchange of materials related to mission, 
and 4) cooperation in the spirit of ecumenicity.
Chairman of the General Assembly of the PROK, Kang Won-yong, 
invited Suzuki to Korea to address the annual meeting in September 1967. 
Introducing the Japanese Moderator, Kang told the delegates that he had 
asked Suzuki to “speak because the Korean church…had a special respon-
sibility for Asia, making the establishment of a good relationship between 
Korea and Japan a task of the utmost urgency…I dared to ask him to speak 
his heart sincerely so that we can know what is really happening in the 
Japanese churches.”(44)
4. Reconciliation After 1967
Suzuki returned from this trip to Korea in a state of exhaustion, 
suffering from the cancer that would take his life in 1969, but satisfied 
that he had accomplished his task. As though taking up his mantle, 
Suzuki’s own Nishikatamachi Church in Tokyo covenanted in 1975 with 
First (Cheil) Church in Seoul to study, walk, and pray together as sister 
churches. Thirty years later, these two churches published a 700-page 
Korean-Japanese bilingual book recalling their shared journey. Their recon-
ciliation at times required great struggle. A Korean prayed frankly at a joint 
service in 2007, “Looking back on the thirty years, there were times where 
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in our hard-heartedness we did not want to accept this relationship, to use 
the word ‘sister’” to refer to the Japanese church.”(45) Regular joint retreats 
and prayer and study sessions, however, helped these churches to under-
stand and model reconciliation. In 2006, they recommitted themselves to 
“strive to understand correctly and to educate others in Korean-Japanese 
history.”(46)
Park Hyeong-kyu, pastor of the First Church in Seoul, was also one of 
the key leaders of the Korean democracy movement. After Park Chung-hee 
seized dictatorial powers and silenced all opposition in the early 1970s, Park 
Hyeong-kyu publicly denounced the president’s actions as unconstitutional 
and inhumane and appealed to Christians of the world to speak out on 
behalf of the oppressed proponents of freedom in Korea. Arrested as he led 
a protest following a 1973 Easter Service, Park Hyeong-kyu was released, 
then arrested and imprisoned three more times over the next six years.(47)
After his first imprisonment, Park appealed to his Japanese Christian 
friends for help. The Japanese then formed a committee that raised nearly 
10,000 dollars from members of 280 Japanese churches to place a full-page 
ad in the May 5, 1974 New York Times. The ad called on American Chris-
tians to support Park Hyeong-kyu and others being persecuted for their 
stand for democracy and human rights in Korea. It summarized an official 
American study deploring the state of affairs in Korea and insisting that the 
American government immediately stop funding the Park regime. The ad 
so disturbed the Korean government that they countered it the next month 
with their own full-page ad in the New York Times.(48)
In 1973, the Kyodan appointed Sawa Masahiko (1939—1989) as its first 
official missionary to Korea.(49) Sawa had visited Korea and studied the 
language prior to his appointment and saw himself as a “bridge” between 
the two countries. He lived in Korea “not to teach the Korean Christians, 
but to think, pray, and walk together with them.”(50)
The Korean government deported Sawa in 1979 after he preached 
that the church should decide matters listening to the word of the Bible 
rather than to governmental authorities.(51) However, when Sawa died in 
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1989 at the age of 50, he had left his mark on the lives of his students and 
colleagues, and as a scholar of Korean history. Korean leaders commended 
Sawa as a “pioneer…one who learned the language, loved the culture, and 
lived in the midst of the Korean people.” “Seeking the path of redemption” 
and painfully aware the “dirty hand of Japan”(52) in Asia, Sawa sought “to 
love, understand, and be a good friend to the Korean people.”(53)
Japanese Christian leaders not af filiated with the Kyodan also 
worked for reconciliation with Korea. Pastor Oyama Reiji described his 
calling to this work in 1956: “while I was reading Matthew 5:23—24…the 
Lord showed me I was to start a movement to apologize for our sins.(54) I 
know during the over one hundred years of its modern history Japan has 
trampled on the people of Asia, leaving them with bitter enmity towards the 
Japanese people.”(55) Oyama went first to the Philippines, where he knew 
“the Filipinos hated the Japanese…because of the war-time cruelty of the 
Japanese soldiers.” Oyama felt the Lord had called him: “I am sending you 
to go and wash the feet of the Filipino people…and to attempt a reconcili-
ation by the Love of God.”(56)
Oyama continued to follow his calling to work for reconciliation with 
Korea. In October 1965 he visited Cheamni Church, located in a village 
outside of Seoul. The church had a traumatic past. On April 15, 1919, 
Japanese soldiers had herded the men of the village men into the church, 
killed them, and then burned both the church and the village. Deeply 
grieved to learn of the soldiers’ cruelty, Oyama committed himself to 
finding some way to demonstrate Japanese repentance to the villagers. 
Seeing that the church building was old and dilapidated, he formed a 
committee of 200 Japanese Christians and collected about 30,000 dollars 
to rebuild the church. On April 15, 1969, the fiftieth anniversary of the 
massacre, Oyama joined with church officials and some of the people of 
Cheamni Church in a ceremony to start the rebuilding project. Villagers 
who had lost family members in the 1919 massacre, however, cried out 
their opposition to accepting Japanese money even while the ceremony 
was proceeding. Only the intervention of higher-level church officials 
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and the promise that the building project would include a museum to 
commemorate the victims made it possible for the rebuilding to proceed. 
The passage of fifty years had not dissipated the grief and emotional poison 
of the tragic event. What was lost could never be restored. Commending 
Oyama and the Japanese Christians for their ef for ts, however, Han 
Kyung-chik called the rebuilding of Cheamni Church “a sign of hope for 
reconciliation between the Korean and Japanese people.”(57)
For a period after the Japanese-Korean reconciliation and Mission 
Agreement, the PCK, along with other denominations, regarded Japan as 
its most important mission field.(58) They sent missionaries to work both 
among the Koreans living in Japan and the Japanese themselves. These 
missionaries have found the Japanese soil far less fruitful than that in 
Korea, making work frustrating at times. Still, as of 2012, 1438 missionaries 
from 87 Korean missions organizations were serving in a variety of minis-
tries.(59) Following the March 11, 2011 earthquake, Korean churches have 
been increasing their commitment to mission in Japan.
Korean mission in Japan takes many forms. In the Amagasaki 
flophouse district of Osaka, for example, a Korean church serves rice balls 
and miso soup to as many as 200 unemployed, homeless men each week. 
About forty have become believers. Churches from four Korean denomina-
tions are located in Amagasaki, and other Korean groups support the work 
of Japanese churches serving the aging homeless population there.(60)
There are limits to reconciliation; unresolved issues continue to divide 
Korea and Japan at a political level. Some government-approved Japanese 
history textbooks, for example delete references to the Japanese invasion 
and occupation of Korea. In the case of Korean women who were forced 
to serve the Japanese army as so-called “comfort women,” apologies 
made by some Japanese politicians are contradicted or retracted by the 
pronouncements of others. The two nations both claim ownership of 
Dokdo/Takeshima Island in the sea between Korea and Japan. All these 
issues trace their roots to differing understandings about the historical 
relations between Japan and Korea.
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Cheil Church and Nishikatamachi Church, their partnership now 
spanning nearly four decades, model a commitment to honest and joint 
examination of the historical relations between Korea and Japan. Japanese 
politicians, however, have wavered in their understanding of these 
historical problems. Prime Minster Abe Shinzo in 2007 and again in 2013 
aroused the ire of Koreans with his contention that the use of the word 
“invasion” to describe Japan’s prewar treatment of Korea “had not been 
agreed upon academically or internationally.”(61) Rebuttals instantly filled 
the front pages of the major Korean newspapers. Abe’s nationalism has 
drawn criticism from government leaders around the world. On these 
political issues, however, virtually all of the Japanese Christian leaders 
stand in solidarity with Korean Christians.(62) Pronouncements of the tiny 
Japanese church turn few heads. 
5. Conclusion
For the two decades following the end of World War II, Japanese and 
Korean Christians had almost no fellowship. This lack of connection left the 
Japanese church in the dark about many things, not the least of which was 
South Korean Christians’ opposition to repatriating Koreans who had been 
living in Japan to communist North Korea. In the early 1960s, Japanese 
Christians began to visit Korea and meet with church leaders there. A 
step towards a reconciliation breakthrough came in 1965 when Japanese 
Christians finally acknowledged the main reason behind South Korean 
church leaders’ protest against the normalization of diplomatic relations 
with Japan: the agreement, no matter how economically fortuitous it may 
have been for the Koreans, lacked any hint of an apology from Japan for its 
brutal colonization of Korea.
In short, the church in Japan had taken a “sympathetic” stance toward 
their Korean brethren, viewing both themselves and the Koreans as 
victims of Japanese militarism and imperialism. The Japanese Christians 
were very reluctant to face the truth of their complicity with the Japanese 
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government, particularly during the period of enforced shrine worship 
from 1938-1945. The Copernican change came about in 1967 when the 
Kyodan finally, definitively, and publicly confessed Japanese Christians’ 
sins toward the Korean Christians. The Korean churches accepted this 
repentance, opening the path to reconciliation. As a result, the Kyodan and 
three prominent Korean denominations signed a mission agreement.(63)
From that time, there was mutual cooperation. Through the 1970s 
and 1980s, Japanese Christians supported their Korean counterparts in 
their struggle against Korea’s military dictatorship. Korean churches have 
made Japan the focus of their mission efforts, working both independently 
and in partnership with Japanese churches to evangelize the hard-to-reach 
population. Churches in both nations have sought to live out reconciliation 
in sister church relationships.
Returning from a Centennial celebration of the Reformed Churches in 
Korea in May 2013, the head of the Japan Evangelical Alliance stated that 
“no barriers to fellowship” now existed between the Korean and Japanese 
churches.(64) The people of both nations get along, and economics relations 
work smoothly. Only in the political realm, however, do tensions build 
and tempers tend to flare whenever a Japanese leader with neo-nationalist 
fervor and lack of historical understanding comes into power. This has 
happened with Abe Shinzo back at the helm.
The Japanese church is a tiny minority within Japanese society. It 
wields little electoral power and lacks influence over its nation’s politics. 
However, by standing in union with the Korean church that now so favors 
Japan, and by together serving “the least of these” in Japan’s hierarchal 
society, it is hoped that an irrefutable message of Christian love and 
reconciliation will shake this island kingdom. The Korean church, the 
church that Japanese imperialism could not crush, strengthened through 
sufferings and blessed with growth, today witnesses to the entire world 
the biblical vision of spears made into plowshares, the dream of sisters 
and brothers once estranged now sitting at the table of fellowship. This 
transformation began with conversation, continued with confession, and 
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now moves forward in shared mission.
The reconciliation of the Japanese and Korean churches has not been 
the exclusive domain of one denomination or theological outlook. Moderate 
and conservative churches can thank more the liberal Christians for their 
initiative in reaching out and courage in resisting government tyranny. 
Liberals can thank the more conservative Christians for extending the 
kingdom of God through revivals and direct evangelism. In both Korea 
and Japan, denominations once rent asunder by theological and other 
dif ferences are learning the magic of shared conversation and pulpit 
exchanges.(65) In a world crying out for healing, other churches too can 
surely find ample common cause, and like the churches of Japan and 
Korea, move forward step by step in the way of reconciliation.
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